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This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt. Policy
choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically-defined
districts.  The legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing. These
revenues can be used to finance a national public good and district-specific transfers (interpreted as
pork-barrel spending). The value of the public good is stochastic, reflecting shocks such as wars or
natural  disasters.  In  equilibrium,  policy-making  cycles  between  two  distinct  regimes:
“business-as-usual”  in  which  legislators  bargain  over  the  allocation  of  pork,  and
“responsible-policy-making” in which policies maximize the collective good. Transitions between
the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good. In the long run,
equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile, public good provision is too low and debt levels












This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation and debt.
The theory is designed to shed light on ﬁscal policy in political systems in which legislators have
primary loyalty to the districts they represent as opposed to a national political party. The theory
yields positive predictions concerning the dynamic evolution of public debt, taxation, and the
allocation of public revenues between national public goods and pork-barrel spending. It also
provides predictions concerning the size of the coalitions that pass legislation. Furthermore, the
theory delivers insights into the normative performance of political decision-making and the case
for ﬁscal restraints in the form of balanced budget requirements.
The theory considers a political jurisdiction in which policy choices are made by a legislature
comprised of representatives elected by single-member, geographically-deﬁned districts. The leg-
islature can raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and by borrowing
in the capital market. Borrowing takes the form of issuing one period bonds. The legislature
can also purchase bonds and use the interest earnings to help ﬁnance future public spending if
it so chooses. Public revenues are used to ﬁnance the provision of a public good that beneﬁts
all citizens and to provide targeted district-speciﬁc transfers, which are interpreted as pork-barrel
spending. The value of the public good to citizens is stochastic, reﬂe c t i n gs h o c k ss u c ha sw a r so r
natural disasters. The legislature makes policy decisions by majority (or super-majority) rule and
legislative policy-making in each period is modelled using the legislative bargaining approach of
Baron and Ferejohn (1989). The level of public debt acts as a state variable, creating a dynamic
linkage across policy-making periods.
There exists a unique political equilibrium and the equilibrium distribution of public debt
converges to a unique invariant distribution. There are two regimes of government policy-making:
business-as-usual (BAU) in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork and responsible-
policy-making (RPM) in which legislators choose to forsake their parochial interests for the national
good. In the BAU regime, the level of public debt and the tax rate are state independent. Public
good spending is responsive to changes in the value of the public good, but these spending changes
are ﬁnanced entirely by adjustments in pork-barrel spending. Legislation is passed by minimum
winning coalitions. In the RPM regime, legislators allocate all revenues to providing the public
good and servicing the debt. No pork is provided and legislation is passed unanimously. Changes
1in the value of the public good lead to changes in taxes and debt as well as public good spending.
The prevailing regime is determined by both the current stock of public debt and the value
of the public good. Speciﬁcally, there is a cut-oﬀ value of the public good that is decreasing in
the stock of debt. Below this cut-oﬀ the legislature is in the BAU regime, while above it RPM
prevails. The structure of the equilibrium reﬂects the fact that revenues are costly to raise since
they must ultimately be ﬁnanced by distortionary income taxation. When the value of the public
good and/or the stock of debt to be repaid is high, the opportunity cost of allocating revenues to
pork-barrel spending is large and hence legislators refrain from such spending.
Transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public
good. Periods of BAU are brought to an end by a high realization of the value of the public good.
This triggers an increase in public debt and taxes to ﬁnance higher public good spending as well
as a cessation of pork-barrel spending. Once in the RPM regime, further high realizations of the
value of the public good result in additional increases in debt and taxes. The economy returns
to BAU only after a suitable sequence of low realizations of the value of the public good. The
larger the amount of public debt that has been built up, the greater the expected time before
returning to BAU. In this way, the economy cycles through periods of BAU and periods of RPM.
Both policy-making regimes are persistent in the sense that the probability of remaining in them
is greater than the probability of transitioning from them.
When the level of public debt chosen in the BAU regime is positive, the economy is in perpetual
deﬁcit, with the extent of the deﬁcit spiking up after a sequence of high values of the public good.
However, legislators do not necessarily borrow in the BAU regime. In some environments, they
purchase bonds with the aim of ﬁnancing future public good spending with the interest earnings.
In such environments, the government will run budget surpluses in the BAU regime and deﬁcits
will arise only after a suitably long sequence of high public good values. The key feature of the
environment determining whether the legislature borrows or saves in the BAU regime is the size of
the tax base relative to the economy’s desired public good spending. Paradoxically, it is economies
with relatively large tax bases that experience perpetual deﬁcits.
With respect to citizen welfare, the equilibrium policy choices generate a strictly lower level of
utility than those that would be made by a benevolent planner. The planning solution involves
the government gradually accumulating a stock of bond holdings suﬃcient to allow it to ﬁnance
ﬁrst best public good provision in all states, without income taxation (Aiyagari et al (2002)). By
2contrast, in equilibrium, the level of public debt never converges to a deterministic steady state
and is bounded below by the level of debt that legislators choose in the BAU regime. Even when
this is negative, so that legislators acquire bonds in the BAU regime, these bond holdings are
insuﬃcient to ﬁnance ﬁrst best public good provision in all states. Thus, in equilibrium, taxes are
too high and public good provision too low in the long run. Moreover, taxes are too volatile.
The theory also has implications for the desirability of balanced budget requirements. We study
a ﬁscal restraint that requires the legislature to ensure that tax revenues equal public spending
in every period. We suppose the government initially has no debt, so that under the restraint
spending is just on public goods and transfers. We ask when will citizens’ welfare be enhanced by
the constraint that public spending be ﬁnanced solely by tax revenues? The key determinant of
the desirability of a balanced budget requirement is again the size of the tax base relative to the
economy’s desired public good spending. When the tax base is relatively large, a balanced budget
requirement will enhance citizen welfare, but when it is relatively small, the opposite conclusion
applies.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss
related literature. Section three presents the model. Section four characterizes the political
equilibrium and develops the positive predictions of the theory. Section ﬁve studies the eﬃciency
of political equilibrium and section six studies the desirability of a balanced budget requirement.
Section seven oﬀers a brief conclusion. The Appendix contains the proofs of the propositions.
2 Related literature
Our theory builds on the well-known tax smoothing theory of ﬁscal policy stemming from Barro
(1979). According to this view, the government should use budget surpluses and deﬁcits as a
buﬀer to prevent tax rates from changing too sharply. Thus, the government should run a deﬁcit
in times of high government spending needs and a surplus when needs are low. Underlying this
theory are the assumptions that government spending needs ﬂu c t u a t eo v e rt i m ea n dt h a tt h e
deadweight costs of income taxes are a convex function of the tax rate.
In an important paper, Aiyagari et al (2002) point out that the tax smoothing logic does not
necessarily imply the counter-cyclical theory of deﬁcits and surpluses that it had been presumed
to. In the absence of “ad hoc” limits on government bond holdings, they prove that in some
3environments the optimal policy is for the government to gradually acquire suﬃcient bond holdings
so as to eventually be able to ﬁnance any level of spending with the interest earnings from these
holdings. This permits the ﬁnancing of government spending without distortionary taxation.
Interest earnings in excess of spending needs are rebated back to citizens via lump-sum transfers.
The economic environment underlying our theory is similar to that in Aiyagari et al (2002).1
The only diﬀerences are (i) that we specify a stochastic value of public goods as opposed to a
stochastic government spending level and (ii) that we include district-speciﬁc transfers in the policy
space. Our main departure from the tax smoothing literature is that policy decisions are made by
a legislature of elected representatives rather than a benevolent planner. This innovation produces
at h e o r yo fﬁscal policy consistent with the original intuitions from the literature, but without
ad hoc limits on government bond holdings. Thus, while the optimal policy in our environment
involves the government gradually acquiring suﬃcient bond holdings to ﬁnance all spending needs
with interest earnings, in political equilibrium the level of public debt ﬂuctuates in accordance
with the value of the public good and serves to smooth income taxes.
Our theory also relates to the political economy of deﬁcits literature.2 A key theme of this
literature is that deﬁcits can arise because of “redistributive uncertainty” (Alesina and Tabellini
(1990), Lizzeri (1999)).3 Such uncertainty arises when citizens do not know whether they will
beneﬁt from redistributive transfers in the future. When faced with such uncertainty, citizens
will favor the transfer of resources from the future to the present if they are certain that these
resources will be used to their beneﬁt .T h i sc a nr e s u l ti nd e ﬁcits. In our model, legislators face
uncertainty as to whether in the next period they will be in the BAU or RPM regimes. In addition,
conditional on being in the BAU regime, they face uncertainty as to whether they will be included
in the minimum winning coalition of districts that receive pork. This redistributive uncertainty
means that if those legislators who are currently in the minimum winning coalition could simply
1 Following Lucas and Stokey (1983), Aiyagari et al (2002) consider an inﬁnite-horizon general equilibrium model
with no capital, a linear tax on labor income, and stochastic government expenditures. Their model departs from
Lucas and Stokey in assuming that the government cannot issue state-contingent debt.
2 For more on this literature see Alesina (2000), Alesina and Perotti (1995), Persson and Svensson (1989), and
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
3 More generally, such redistributive uncertainty can explain many ineﬃcient decisions in dynamic political
economy models. For example, public investments that are potentially Pareto improving may not be undertaken
because those currently holding political power are uncertain as to whether those holding political power in the
future will share the fruits of the investment (Besley and Coate (1998)). For further discussions of political failure
in dynamic models see Acemoglu (2003), Besley and Coate (1998), Coate and Morris (1999) and Hassler et al
(2003).
4transfer a dollar costlessly from the future to the present period, they would want to do so. This in
turn explains why it is the case that the equilibrium level of public debt (even when it is negative)
is always above the eﬃcient level.
The contribution of our paper relative to the political economy of deﬁcits literature is that
we imbed a sophisticated model of political decision-making into a dynamic general equilibrium
model that incorporates the key assumptions of the tax smoothing literature. Thus, our underlying
economic model incorporates an inﬁnite horizon, stochastic public good preferences, distortionary
income taxation, district-speciﬁc transfers, and public debt. This allows us to integrate the polit-
ical economy and tax smoothing literatures by developing a theory of ﬁscal policy with a rich set
of economic and political predictions. Moreover, the theory permits a welfare analysis of both the
eﬃciency properties of equilibrium and the case for ﬁscal restraints.4
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on the eﬃciency of legislative policy-making in
political systems in which legislators have geographically-deﬁned constituencies. In a well-known
paper, Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) argue that pork-barrel spending will lead to a
government that is too large. They do not model the process of passing legislation, assuming
instead that legislative policy-making is governed by a “norm of universalism”. Under this norm,
each legislator unilaterally decides on the level of spending he would like on projects in his own
district and the aggregate level of taxation is determined by the need to balance the budget.
Policy-making then becomes a pure common pool problem. A number of authors have argued
that this common pool logic may also explain budget deﬁcits - see, for example, Inman (1990)
and von Hagen and Harden (1995). Velasco (2000) formally models the accumulation of public
debt as a dynamic common pool problem. While there is no social role for debt in his model,
he demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in which deﬁcits and debt accumulation continue
unabated until the government’s debt ceiling is reached.
A number of papers study the eﬃciency of legislative policy-making using the legislative bar-
4 Lizzeri (1999) considers a two period model with one good and Downsian political competition in each period.
Social welfare is unaﬀected by the allocation of resources across the periods. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) study the
steady states of an inﬁnite horizon model in which in each period two political parties hold oﬃce with exogenous
probability. There are two goods that may be publicly-provided, but each party’s constituency values only one.
Accordingly, the goods can be thought of as transfers targeted to the two parties’ constituencies. Taxes are
distortionary. In each period, the winning party chooses taxes, debt and how much to spend on the publicly
provided good that its constituency cares about. Our model generalizes this set-up in two key ways. First, we
have n political decision makers with distinct constituencies who must collectively choose policy in each period via
majority rule. Second, we have a national public good with stochastic value as well as targeted transfers. The
latter assumption creates a tax smoothing role for debt.
5gaining approach employed in this paper. Baron (1991) shows that legislators may propose projects
whose aggregate beneﬁts are less than their costs, when these beneﬁts can be targeted to particular
districts. Related models are elaborated by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Austen-Smith and
Banks (2005). LeBlanc, Snyder and Tripathi (2000) argue that legislatures will under-invest in
public goods. They make their argument in the context of a ﬁn i t eh o r i z o nm o d e li nw h i c hi ne a c h
period a legislature allocates a ﬁxed amount of revenue between targeted transfers and a public
investment that serves to increase the amount of revenue available in the next period. In a paper
that lays some of the analytical ground work for the theory presented in this paper, Battaglini and
Coate (2005) develop an inﬁnite horizon model of legislative policy-making in which the legislature
can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and these revenues can be used to ﬁnance invest-
ment in a national public good and pork-barrel spending. They explore the dynamics of legislative
policy choices, focusing on the eﬃciency of the steady state level of taxation and the allocation of
tax revenues between pork and investment. They obtain conditions under which the equilibrium
size of government is too large and the level of public goods too low. However, they also show
that there are conditions under which legislative decisions are eﬃcient and/or government is too
small. In contrast to the present paper, there is no public debt, and it is investment in the public
good that creates the dynamic linkage across policy-making periods. Moreover, the value of the
public good is deterministic.
3T h e m o d e l
A continuum of inﬁnitely-lived citizens live in n identical districts indexed by i =1 ,...,n.T h es i z e
of the population in each district is normalized to be one. There are three goods - a public good
g; consumption z;a n dl a b o rl. The consumption good is produced from labor according to the
technology z = wl and the public good can be produced from the consumption good according
to the technology g = z/p. Each citizen’s per period utility function is z + Agα − l(1+1/ε)
ε+1 ,w h e r e
α ∈ (0,1) and ε > 0. The parameter A m e a s u r e st h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ep u b l i cg o o dt o
the citizens. Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate δ.
The assumptions on technology imply that the competitive equilibrium price of the public
good is p and the wage rate is w. Moreover, the quasi-linear utility speciﬁcation implies that the
interest rate is ρ =1 /δ − 1. At this interest rate, citizens will be indiﬀerent as to their allocation
of consumption across time and hence their welfare will equal that which they would obtain if
6they simply consumed their net earnings each period. At wage rate w, each citizen will work an
amount l∗(w)=( εw)ε in each period, so that ε is the elasticity of labor supply. The associated





The value of the public good varies across periods in a random way, reﬂe c t i n gs h o c k st ot h e
society such as wars and natural disasters. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i ne a c hp e r i o d ,A is the realization of a
random variable with range [A,A]( w h e r e0<A< A) and cumulative distribution function G(A).
The function G is continuously diﬀerentiable and its associated density is bounded uniformly
below by some positive constant ξ > 0, so that for any pair of realizations such that A<A 0,t h e
diﬀerence G(A0)−G(A)i sa tl e a s ta sb i ga sξ(A0 −A). Thus, G assigns positive probability to all
nondegenerate sub-intervals of [A,A].
Public decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each of the n
districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district’s representative. Since all
citizens are the same, the identity of the representative is immaterial and hence the selection
process can be ignored. The legislature meets at the beginning of each period. These meetings
take only an insigniﬁcant amount of time, and representatives undertake private sector work in
the rest of the period just like everybody else. The aﬃrmative votes of q ≤ n representatives are
required to enact any legislation.
The legislature can raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and
via borrowing in the capital market. Borrowing takes the form of issuing one period bonds with
interest rate ρ.5 Thus, if the government borrows an amount b in period t,i tm u s tr e p a y
b(1 + ρ)i np e r i o dt +1 . P u b l i cr e v e n u e sc a nb eu s e dt oﬁnance the provision of public goods
but can also be diverted to ﬁnance targeted district-speciﬁc transfers, which are interpreted as
(non-distortionary) pork-barrel spending.6 The legislature can also hold bonds if it so chooses,
so that b can be negative.
To describe how legislative decision-making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the
beginning of a period in which the current level of public debt is b and the value of the public
5 Thus we do not consider state-contingent debt as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). We feel that this is the
appropriate assumption for a positive analysis.
6 The district-speciﬁc transfers could be either direct grants to particular localities or earmarks for speciﬁc public
projects that the districts would undertake anyway. In the latter case, the earmarks would be non-distortionary
and equivalent to a direct transfer.
7good is A. One of the legislators is randomly selected to make the ﬁrst policy proposal, with
each representative having an equal chance of being recognized. A proposal is described by an
n+3-tuple{r,g,x,s1,....,sn},w h e r er i st h ei n c o m et a xr a t e ;g is the amount of the public good
provided; x is the proposed new level of public debt; and si is the proposed transfer to district i’s
residents. The revenues raised under the proposal are x + R(r)w h e r e
R(r)=nrwl∗(w(1 − r)) = nrw(εw(1 − r))ε, (2)
denotes the tax revenue function. The proposal must satisfy the budget constraint that revenues
must be suﬃcient to cover expenditures. Letting
B(r,g,x;b)=x + R(r) − pg − (1 + ρ)b (3)
denote the diﬀerence between revenues and spending on public goods and debt repayment, this
requires that B(r,g,x;b) ≥
X
i si. The set of constraints is completed by the non-negativity
constraints that si ≥ 0 for each district i (which rules out ﬁnancing public spending via district-
speciﬁc lump sum taxes).
If the ﬁrst proposer’s plan is accepted by q legislators, then it is implemented and the legislature
adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, the legislature meets again with
the diﬀerence being that the initial level of public debt is x and there is a new realization of the
value of public goods. If, on the other hand, the ﬁrst proposal is not accepted, another legislator is
chosen to make a proposal. There are T ≥ 2 such proposal rounds, each of which takes a negligible
amount of time. If the process continues until proposal round T,a n dt h ep r o p o s a lm a d ea tt h a t
stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to choose a default policy. The key restriction on
t h ec h o i c eo fad e f a u l tp o l i c yi st h a ti tm u s ti n v o l v eau n i f o r md i s t r i c t - s p e c i ﬁc transfer.
There are limits on both the amount the government can borrow and the amount of bonds
it can hold. Thus, x ∈ [x,x]w h e r ex is the maximum amount that the government can borrow
and −x is the maximum amount of bonds that it can hold. The limit on borrowing is determined
by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold government bonds that they know will not be repaid.
If the government were borrowing an amount x such that the interest payments exceeded the
maximum possible tax revenues; i.e., ρx>maxr R(r) ,t h e ni tw o u l db eu n a b l et or e p a yt h ed e b t
even if it provided no public goods. Thus, the maximum level of debt is certainly less than this
level, implying that x ≤ maxr R(r)/ρ. In fact, we will assume that x is slightly smaller than
8maxr R(r)/ρ.T h i si sb e c a u s ei fx equals maxr R(r)/ρ then if government debt ever reached x it
would stay there forever, because the legislature could never pay it oﬀ. For our dynamic results,
it is convenient to assume away this (relatively uninteresting) possibility.
T h el i m i to nt h ea m o u n to fb o n d st h a tt h eg o v e r n m ent can hold is determined constitutionally.
The government is allowed to hold no more than the amount of bonds that would allow it to ﬁnance
the Samuelson level of the public good from interest earnings. Thus, x = −pgS(A)/ρ, where gS(A)
is the level of the public good that satisﬁes the Samuelson Rule when the value of the public good
is A.7 The Samuelson Rule is that the sum of marginal beneﬁts equal the marginal cost, which
means that gS(A)s a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst order condition that nαAgα−1 = p.
4 Political equilibrium
We look for a symmetric stationary equilibrium in which any representative selected to propose at
round τ ∈ {1,...,T} of the meeting at some time t makes the same proposal and this depends only
on the current level of public debt (b) and the value of the public good (A). Such an equilibrium is
characterized by a collection of functions: {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1.H e r erτ(b,A)
is the income tax rate that is proposed at round τ when the state is (b,A); gτ(b,A)i st h el e v e lo f
the public good; and xτ(b,A) is the new level of public debt. The proposer also oﬀers a transfer
of sτ(b,A) to the districts of q − 1 randomly selected representatives where (recall) q is the size
of a minimum winning coalition.8 Any remaining surplus revenues are used to ﬁnance a transfer
for the proposer’s own district. We focus, without loss of generality, on equilibria in which at each
round τ, proposals are immediately accepted by at least q legislators, so that on the equilibrium
path, no meeting lasts more than one proposal round. Accordingly, the policies that are actually
implemented in equilibrium are described by {r1(b,A), g1(b,A), x1(b,A), s1(b,A)}.
To be more precise, {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1 is an equilibrium if at each
proposal round τ and all states (b,A), the equilibrium proposal maximizes the proposer’s payoﬀ
subject to the incentive constraint of getting the required number of aﬃrmative votes and the
appropriate feasibility constraints. To state this more formally, let v1(b,A) denote the legislators’
7 The substantive conclusions of the paper would be unaﬀected by assuming that the government could hold
more bonds than this or even that there was no upper limit on government bond holdings. It is, however, important
for our conclusions concerning the nature of the planner’s solution that the government can hold at least this level
of bonds (see Aiyagari et al (2002)).
8 It should be clear that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the proposer only oﬀers transfers to q−1
representatives.
9round one value function which describes the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator at the beginning
o fap e r i o di nw h i c ht h es t a t ei s( b,A). In addition, let vτ+1(b,A) denote the expected future payoﬀ
of a legislator in the out-of-equilibrium event that the proposal at round τ is rejected. Then, for




u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEv1(x,A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEv1(x,A0) ≥ vτ+1(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(4)
The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive constraint and the remainder are feasibility constraints.
The legislators’ round one value function is deﬁned recursively by





To understand this recall that a legislator is chosen to propose in round one with probability 1/n.
If chosen to propose, he obtains a payoﬀ in that period of
u(w(1 − r1(b,A)),g 1(b,A);A)+B(r1(b,A),g 1(b,A),x 1(b,A);b) − (q − 1)s1(b,A). (6)
If he is not chosen to propose, but is included in the minimum winning coalition, he obtains u(w(1−
r1(b,A)),g 1(b,A);A)+s1(b,A) and if he is not included he obtains just u(w(1−r1(b,A)),g 1(b,A);A).
The probability that he will be included in the minimum winning coalition, conditional on not
being chosen to propose, is (q−1)/(n−1). Taking expectations, the pork barrel transfers s1(b,A)
cancel and the period payoﬀ i sa sd e s c r i b e di n( 5 ) .
For all proposal rounds τ =1 ,..,T −1 the expected future payoﬀ of a legislator if the round τ
proposal is rejected is





This reﬂects the assumption that the round τ + 1 proposal will be accepted. Recall that if the
round T proposal is rejected, the assumption is that a legislator is appointed to choose a default
10tax rate, public goods level, level of debt and a uniform transfer. Thus,










Given an equilibrium {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1, we call the interval of debt
levels [inf(b,A) x1(b,A),x]t h epolicy domain. Levels of debt outside this range will never be ob-
served except when exogenously assumed at date zero. An equilibrium is said to be well-behaved
if the associated round one legislators’ value function satisﬁes the following three properties: (i)
v1 is continuous on the state space; (ii) for all A, v1(·,A) is concave on [x,x] and strictly concave
on the policy domain; and (iii) for all b, v1(·,A)i sd i ﬀerentiable at b for almost all A.W e w i l l
restrict attention to well-behaved equilibria in what follows, showing that there exists a unique
such equilibrium. Henceforth when we refer to an equilibrium it should be understood to be well-
behaved. Finally, note that economy-wide aggregate utility in an equilibrium at the beginning of
some period in which the state is (b,A)i sg i v e nb ynv1(b,A). This follows from the fact that each
district has a population of size 1 and representatives obtain the same payoﬀsa st h e i rc o n s t i t u e n t s .
4.1 The equilibrium policy proposals
The basic structure of the equilibrium policy proposals is easily understood. To get support for
his proposal, the proposer must obtain the votes of q − 1 other representatives. Accordingly,
given that utility is transferable, he is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the utility of q
legislators. The optimal policy will depend upon the state (b,A). If the level of public debt (b)
and/or the value of the public good (A)a r es u ﬃciently high, then even though the proposer is
only taking into account the well-being of q legislators, he will still not want to divert resources
to pork. Pork requires reducing public good spending or increasing taxation in the present or
the future (if ﬁnanced by issuing additional debt). When b and/or A are suﬃciently high, the
marginal beneﬁt of spending on the public good and the marginal cost of increasing taxation are
both too high to make pork attractive. The proposer will therefore choose a policy package that
does not involve pork and the outcome will be as if he is maximizing the utility of the legislature
as a whole. If b and/or A are lower, then the opportunity cost ofp o r ki sl e s s e n e da n dt h ec o l l e c t i v e
utility of the q legislators will be maximized by diverting some resources to pork. Accordingly,
the proposer will propose pork for the districts associated with his minimum winning coalition.
In equilibrium, therefore, there will exist a cut-oﬀ value of the public good, inversely related
11to the level of public debt, that divides the state space into two ranges. Above the cut-oﬀ,t h e
legislature will be in the responsible-policy-making regime (RPM) and, in every proposal round,
the proposer will propose a no-pork policy package that maximizes aggregate legislator (and also
citizen) utility. These proposals will be supported by the entire legislature. Below the cut-oﬀ,
the legislature will be in the business-as-usual regime (BAU) and, in every proposal round the
proposer chooses a policy package that provides pork for his own district and those of a minimum
winning coalition of representatives. The tax rate-public good-public debt triple maximizes the
aggregate utility of q legislators, given that they appropriate all the surplus revenues. The transfer
paid out to coalition members is just suﬃcient to make them favor accepting the proposal. Thus,
only those legislators whose districts receive pork vote for these proposals.
To develop this more precisely, consider the problem of choosing the tax rate-public good-
public debt triple that maximizes the collective utility of q representatives under the assumption
that they divide any surplus revenues among their districts and that the constraint that these
revenues be non-negative is non-binding. Formally, the problem is:
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
q + δEv1(x,A0)
s.t. x ∈ [x,x].
(9)
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem together with equations (1) and (2), it can easily
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]( =i f x∗ < x). (12)
To interpret these conditions, note that (1 − r)/(1 − r(1 + ε)) measures the marginal cost of
taxation - the social cost of raising an additional unit of revenue via a tax increase. It exceeds
unity whenever the tax rate (r) is positive, because taxation is distortionary. For a given tax
rate, the marginal cost of taxation is higher the more elastic is labor supply; that is, the higher
12is ε. Condition (10) therefore says that the beneﬁt of raising taxes in terms of increasing the
per-legislator transfer (1/q) must equal the per-capita cost of the increase in the tax rate (1 −
r)/n(1 − r(1 + ε)). Condition (11) says that the per-capita beneﬁt of increasing the public good
must equal the per-legislator reduction in transfers that providing the additional unit necessitates.
Condition (12) says that the beneﬁt of increasing debt in terms of increasing the per-legislator
transfer must equal the per-capita cost of an increase in the debt level. This cost is that there is a
higher initial level of debt next period. This condition can hold as an inequality, if the debt level
is at its ceiling.





max{A : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0} if B(r∗,0,x;b) ≥ 0
0i f B(r∗,0,x;b) < 0
. (13)
Intuitively, A∗(b,x) is the largest value of A consistent with the triple (r∗,g∗(A),x) satisfying the
constraint that B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0. It follows that if A ≤ A∗(b,x∗), the proposer proposes the
triple (r∗,g∗(A),x ∗)t o g e t h e rw i t hat r a n s f e rj u s ts u ﬃcient to induce members of the coalition to
accept the proposal and the legislature is in the BAU regime. If A>A ∗(b,x∗), then the constraint
that B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0 must bind and the solution equals that which maximizes aggregate legislator
utility. This follows from the observation that if the solution to the problem of maximizing the
utility of q representatives does not involve transfers, then this solution must also solve the problem
of maximizing the utility of n representatives. The legislature is therefore in the RPM regime.
Thus, we have:
Proposition 1: Let {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated
value function v1(b,A). Then, there exists some debt level x∗ such that for any proposal round τ
if A>A ∗(b,x∗)











and sτ(b,A)=0 ,while if A ≤ A∗(b,x∗)







n if τ =1 ,....,T − 1
vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − r∗,g∗(A);A) − δEv1(x∗,A 0)i f τ = T
.
In the RPM regime (i.e., when A>A ∗(b,x∗)), Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium tax
rate-public good-public debt triple is implicitly deﬁned by the following three conditions:
nαAgα−1 = p[
1 − r








]( =i f x<x), (15)
and
B(r,g,x;b)=0 . (16)
Condition (14) says that the level of the public good should be such that the social marginal beneﬁt
equals the price p times the marginal cost of taxation. The social beneﬁt of raising additional
revenue by issuing more public debt is that it saves raising that revenue by taxes. Thus, condition
(15) says that the level of public debt should be such that the marginal social beneﬁto fr a i s i n g
public debt equals the expected marginal social cost. In the Appendix (section 8.2), we show that
in the RPM regime, the tax rate, public debt level, and the level of the public good all depend
positively on the value of the public good (A). In addition, the tax rate and level of public debt
depend positively on the current level of debt (b), while the level of the public good depends
negatively on b.
It is important to note that at A = A∗(b,x∗)t h et r i p l e( r∗,g∗(A),x ∗) maximizes aggregate
legislator utility. To see this, note that B(r∗,g∗(A),x ∗;b)e q u a l sz e r oa tA = A∗(b,x∗). Fur-













]( =i f x∗ < x). (18)
Thus, the equilibrium policy proposal is a continuous function of the state (b,A). Moreover, given
the monotonicity properties of the solution in the RPM regime, it follows that when A>A ∗(b,x∗),
14the equilibrium policy proposal involves a tax rate higher than r∗, the provision of a public good
level below g∗(A), and a level of debt that exceeds x∗. The level of debt x∗ therefore forms a lower
bound on the government’s debt holdings.
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n + δEv1(x∗,A 0)i f A ≤ A∗(x,x∗)
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n )i f A>A ∗(x,x∗)
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1+ρ
n )i f A ≤ A∗(x,x∗)
. (20)
The discontinuity that arises in the derivative of the value function reﬂects the fact that a higher
future level of debt reduces pork if the legislature is in the BAU regime and increases taxes if the
legislature is in the RPM regime. Increasing taxes is more costly than reducing pork because of
the marginal cost of public funds.
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)dG(A) (21)









1 − r1(x∗,A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A)( =i f x∗ < x). (22)
Our assumption concerning the maximum debt level x implies that A∗(x,x) <A .T h u s , s i n c e
taxes exceed r∗ in the RPM regime, the expected marginal social cost of debt must exceed n/q
when x∗ = x. It follows that x∗ < x and condition (22) holds as an equality.
Condition (22) provides important insights into the determinants of the debt level x∗.W h e n
q<n , it implies that A∗(x∗,x ∗) must lie strictly between A and A. Intuitively, this means that the
debt level x∗ must be such that the legislature will transition out of BAU with positive probability
15and stay in it with positive probability. Recall that A∗(x∗,x ∗) is implicitly deﬁned by the equation
R(r∗) − ρx∗ = pg∗(A). Thus, if R(r∗) >p g ∗(A), interest payments must be positive to soak up
the excess tax revenues and hence x∗ is positive. On the other hand, if R(r∗) <p g ∗(A), then
interest earnings are required to supplement scarce tax revenues and x∗ must be negative. The
key determinant of the magnitude of x∗ is therefore the size of the tax base as measured by R(r∗)
relative to the economy’s desired public good spending as measured by pg∗(A). The greater the
relative size of the tax base, the larger is the debt level chosen in the BAU regime.
4.2 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
The foregoing analysis of equilibrium policy proposals presumes that an equilibrium exists. The
key to validating this presumption is to demonstrate the existence of a round one value function
v1(b,A) with the desired properties. In general, establishing the existence of a value function
in dynamic games is much more diﬃcult than establishing the existence of a value function for
a planner’s problem, because the equilibrium policy proposals do not necessarily maximize the
players’ value function. However, we can exploit the structure of the equilibrium unveiled in the
previous section to make the problem tractable.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium we start by deﬁning F∗ to be the set of all real valued
functions v deﬁned over the state space that are continuous and concave in x for all A. Then, for
all z ∈ [x,x], we deﬁne an operator Tz on F∗ as follows:













Thus, given that future payoﬀs are described by δEv(x,A0), the problem is to maximize average
legislator utility, but subject to the constraint that the tax rate must be at least r∗, the public
debt level must be at least z and the public good level can be no more than g∗(A). By standard
arguments (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989)), Tz is a contraction and Tz(v) belongs to F∗.
Thus, for all z,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u eﬁxed point vz which is continuous and concave in x for all A.
From Proposition 1 and the subsequent discussion, it should be clear that if v1 is an equilibrium
round one value function and x∗ is the level of public debt that is chosen in the BAU regime, then
v1 = vx∗. Moreover, it must be the case that x∗ maximizes x/q + δEvx∗(x,A). The next step,





and to demonstrate that there exists z∗ such that z∗ belongs to M(z∗). We then show that
the policy functions associated with the value function vz∗ are unique and deﬁne an equilibrium.
Moreover, for all A, vz∗(·,A) is strictly concave on the policy domain [z∗,x]a n df o ra l lx the
function vz∗(·,A)i sd i ﬀerentiable at x for almost all A. In this way, we establish:9
Proposition 2: There exists an equilibrium.
Importantly, we can also prove that there can be at most one equilibrium. The argument
proceeds via contradiction. Suppose that there were two equilibria with associated round one
value functions v0 and v1.L e t x∗
0 and x∗
1 be the corresponding debt levels chosen in the BAU
regimes associated with each equilibrium and suppose that x∗
0 <x ∗
1. Then, we demonstrate that













Thus, the expected marginal social cost of borrowing with an initial debt level x in the high debt
equilibrium exceeds that in the low debt equilibrium with an initial debt level x−(x∗
1−x∗
0)/(1+ρ0).
From equation (22), we know that the expected marginal social costs of borrowing at x∗
1 and x∗
0

















0)/(1+ρ0)-w h i c hi s
a contradiction. In this way, we obtain:
Proposition 3: T h e r ee x i s t sa tm o s to n ee q u i l i b r i u m .
4.3 Dynamics
Having understood the structure of equilibrium policy proposals and established the existence of
a unique equilibrium, we are now ready to explore the dynamic evolution of ﬁscal policy. We will
show that, irrespective of the economy’s initial debt level, the same distribution of debt emerges in
9 Our strategy for proving existence suggests a simple two-step algorithm to computing an equilibrium. First,
ﬁnd the value function vz associated with each z. Then, solve for a ﬁxed point of the correspondence M(z)i n[ x,x].
17the long run. Moreover, this distribution of debt is non-degenerate: even in the long-run, shocks
in the value of the public good induce persistent cycles between the two policy-making regimes.
This is in sharp contrast to the planner’s solution for the economy in which, as we will show in the
next section, the level of debt converges to a unique degenerate value. Political decision-making
therefore fundamentally alters the dynamic pattern of ﬁscal policy.
Let {r1(b,A), g1(b,A), x1(b,A)} be the equilibrium round one policy functions and let x∗
be the level of public debt chosen in the BAU regime. The equilibrium policies determine a
distribution of public debt levels in each period. Let ψt(x) denote the distribution function of the
current level of debt at the beginning of period t. The distribution function ψ1(x) is exogenous
and is determined by the economy’s initial level of debt b0. To describe the distribution of debt
in periods t ≥ 2, we must ﬁrst describe the transition function implied by the equilibrium. First,
deﬁne the function b A :[ x,x] × (x∗,x] → [A,A] as follows:
b A(b,x)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
A if x<x 1(b,A)
min{A ∈ [A,A]:x1(b,A)=x} if x ∈ [x1(b,A),x 1(b,A)]
A if x>x 1(b,A)
. (27)
Intuitively, b A(b,x) is the smallest value of public goods under which the equilibrium debt level





G( b A(b,x)) if x ∈ (x∗,x]
G(A∗(b,x∗)) if x = x∗
. (28)
Intuitively, H(b,x) is the probability that in the next period the initial level of debt will be less
than or equal to x ∈ [x∗,x]i ft h ec u r r e n tl e v e lo fd e b ti sb. Using this notation, the distribution





Our main interest is to understand how the equilibrium debt distribution evolves over time. In
particular, does it converge to some limit distribution? We say that the sequence of distributions
hψt(x)i converges to the distribution ψ(x) if for all x ∈ [x∗,x], we have that limt→∞ ψt(x)=ψ(x).10





We can now establish:
Proposition 4: Let {r1(b,A),s 1(b,A),g 1(b,A),x 1(b,A)} be the round one equilibrium policy func-
tions. Then, the implied sequence of debt distributions hψt(x)i converges to a unique invariant
distribution ψ∗(x).
Thus, no matter what the economy’s initial debt level, the same distribution of debt emerges
in the long run. The lower bound of the support of this distribution is x∗ - the level of public
debt chosen in the BAU regime. There is a mass point at this debt level, since the probability of
remaining at x∗ having reached it is G(A∗(x∗,x ∗)) - which is positive. However, the distribution
of debt is non-degenerate because there is a positive probability of leaving the BAU regime (since
G(A∗(x∗,x ∗)) < 1). If x∗ is positive, the economy is in perpetual deﬁcit, with the extent of the
deﬁcit spiking up after a sequence of high values of the public good. When x∗ is negative, the
government will run budget surpluses in good times (i.e., when A is low) and deﬁcits only after a
suitable sequence of high realizations of the value of the public good.
To get an intuitive feel for the long run dynamics of the system, suppose that the legislature
is in the BAU regime in period t − 1, implying that the level of debt is x∗ at the beginning of
period t.I fAt is less than A∗(x∗,x ∗), then the legislature remains in BAU in period t.T h et a x
rate will be r∗ and the amount of public good provided will be g∗(At). Government debt will be
just rolled over and expenditures on pork will be R(r∗) − pg∗(At) − ρx∗. On the other hand, if
At exceeds A∗(x∗,x ∗), then the legislature will transition to RPM. To meet the costs of the public
good pg1(x∗,A t), the legislature will raise taxes and borrowing; that is, the tax rate r1(x∗,A t)w i l l
exceed r∗ and the level of debt x1(x∗,A t) will exceed x∗. Moreover, it will cease all pork barrel
spending.
Assuming that At exceeds A∗(x∗,x ∗), the legislature will remain in RPM in period t +1i f
At+1 exceeds the threshold A∗(x1(x∗,A t),x ∗). The probability of remaining in RPM exceeds
the probability of transitioning to it in period t since A∗(x∗,x ∗) exceeds A∗(x1(x∗,A t),x ∗). If
At+1 is such that the legislature returns to BAU, the tax rate will be reduced to r∗, the debt level
10 In the present environment, this deﬁnition is equivalent to the requirement that the sequence of probability
measures associated with hψt(x)i converges weakly to the probability measure associated with ψ(x)( s e eS t o k e y ,
Lucas and Prescott (1989) Theorem 12.8).
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Figure 1: The dynamics of the political equilibrium.
reduced to x∗ and the amount of public good provided will be g∗(At+1). The retirement of the
additional debt is ﬁnanced solely by a reduction in pork (as opposed to a cut back in public good
spending or an increase in taxes). On the other hand, if At+1 is such that the legislature remains
in RPM, the higher current level of debt will make the legislature less inclined to spend, in the
sense that g1(x1(x∗,A t),A)i sl e s st h a ng1(x∗,A) for all A. Moreover, both taxes and borrowing
will be higher for any given value of the public good (i.e., r1(x1(x∗,A t),A) exceeds r1(x∗,A)a n d
x1(x1(x∗,A t),A) exceeds x1(x∗,A) for all A). Thus, if the value of the public good remains as in
period t, citizens will experience a decrease in public good spending and further increases in taxes
and debt.
For a graphical analysis of the dynamics of the system, let AL be less than A∗(x∗,x ∗)a n d
20AH larger than A∗(x∗,x ∗). Again, suppose that the legislature is in BAU in period t − 1s ot h a t
the level of debt is x∗ at the beginning of period t. Further suppose that in periods t through tL
the value of the public good is AL;i np e r i o d stL +1t h r o u g htH the value of the public good is
AH;a n di np e r i o d stH +1 the value of the public good returns to AL. Then, the dynamic pattern
of public debt, tax rates and public good provision is as represented in Figure 1. At date tL +1
debt, taxes and public good levels jump up in response to the increase in A. During periods tL+1
through tH, debt and taxes continue to rise, while public good provision falls. In period tH +1 ,
public good provision drops in response to the fall in A, overshooting its natural level g∗(AL).
After period tH + 1 debt and taxes start to fall and public good provision increases. Eventually,
the legislature returns to BAU.
To summarize: in the long-run, legislative policy-making oscillates between BAU and RPM.
Periods of BAU are brought to an end by a high realization of the value of public goods. This
triggers an increase in public debt and taxes to ﬁnance higher public good spending and a cessation
of pork-barrel spending. Once in the RPM regime, further high realizations of the value of the
public good trigger further increases in debt and higher taxes. Policy-making returns to BAU
only after a suitable sequence of low realizations of the value of the public good. The larger the
amount of public debt that has been built up, the greater the expected time before returning to BAU.
Both policy-making regimes are persistent in the sense that the probability of remaining in them
is greater than the probability of transitioning from them.
5T h e e ﬃciency of political equilibrium
To understand the theory’s implications concerning eﬃciency, we focus on a comparison of the
political equilibrium and the policies that would be chosen by a social planner whose objective
is to maximize aggregate utility. We refer to the planner’s solution as “the eﬃcient solution”.
This is motivated by the fact that the planner’s solution is the unique Pareto eﬃcient policy
sequence in the set of policy sequences that provide all citizens with the same expected payoﬀ.
Since all citizens have the same expected payoﬀ in political equilibrium, divergencies between
the equilibrium and the planner’s policy sequences represent Pareto ineﬃciencies and thereby
constitute “political failures” in the sense deﬁned by Besley and Coate (1998).
215.1 The eﬃcient solution
While the eﬃcient solution could be derived from ﬁrst principles, it is instructive to derive it
as a special case of our equilibrium model. The eﬃcient solution is exactly that which would
emerge in equilibrium if the legislature operated under a rule of unaminity; that is, if q = n.
As noted earlier, representatives obtain the same payoﬀs as their constituents and when q = n,
the equilibrium policy sequence maximizes aggregate legislator utility. It follows that the eﬃcient
solution has the same form as the equilibrium, except that the equilibrium variables are those
associated with q = n. Thus, the tax rate in the BAU regime (r∗) equals 0 and the level of public
g o o d sp r o v i d e di st h eS a m u e l s o nl e v e l( g∗(A)=gS(A)) (see equations (10) and (11)). Because







1 − r1(x∗,A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A). (31)
This equation implies that at debt level x∗, the future tax rate must be 0 with probability one.
Since r1(x∗,A) exceeds 0 for all A>A ∗(x∗,x ∗), this requires that A∗(x∗,x ∗)=A. This in turn
implies that x∗ = x. At this debt level, the government’s interest earnings on its bond holdings
are always suﬃcient to ﬁnance the Samuelson level of public goods, implying that no taxation is
necessary.
We conclude that the eﬃcient solution has the following form. When the state is such that
A ≤ A∗(b,x), the tax rate is zero, the public good level is the Samuelson level and the debt
level is x. Surplus revenues (which will be positive assuming A<A ∗(b,x)) are redistributed to
citizens via (uniform) district-speciﬁc transfers. When the state is such that A>A ∗(b,x), the
optimal policy involves positive levels of taxation, the provision of a public good level below the
Samuelson level and a level of debt that exceeds x. There are no surplus revenues and hence no
district-speciﬁc transfers.
It is clear from this discussion that the distribution that puts point mass on the debt level x is an
invariant distribution. For once the government has accumulated this level of bonds, it can provide
Samuelson levels of the public good without distortionary taxation. Any surplus interest payments
can be redistributed as a uniform district-speciﬁc transfer. These transfers are lump-sum and
create no distortion. The legislature has no incentive to run down accumulations by redistributing
revenues via additional transfers because this would necessitate the use of distortionary taxation
22in the future.
It follows from Proposition 4 that the distribution of debt implied by the eﬃcient solution
converges to the distribution that puts point mass on the debt level x. Intuitively, whenever the
government’s holdings of bonds are less than x, the planner must anticipate using income taxation
to ﬁnance public good provision in some states of the world either currently or in the future. By
accumulating more bonds when the current value of public goods is low, he can reduce the need
to levy income taxes. This is always beneﬁcial and hence the trend towards an increase in bond
holdings.
To summarize: the eﬃcient solution converges to a steady state in which bond holdings are
maintained at level x. In this steady state, there is no taxation and the Samuelson level of the public
good is provided in each period. Public good spending is ﬁnanced entirely from interest earnings.
Interest earnings in excess of public good spending are distributed to citizens via transfers.
5.2 Political failure
Comparing the eﬃcient solution with the equilibrium, we obtain:
Proposition 5: If q<nthe equilibrium policy sequence is ineﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, in the long
run, the level of debt held by the government is too high relative to the eﬃcient level, tax rates are
too high, and public good levels are too low. Moreover, tax rates are too volatile.
The fundamental reasons for the ineﬃciency can be understood most easily by seeing what
would happen if the intial level of public debt were equal to the eﬃcient level x. Then, the
minimum winning coalition of legislators controlling policy could levy zero taxes, provide the ﬁrst
best level of public goods and maintain the level of debt, all while providing transfers to their
districts with the surplus interest earnings. However, they will not do this. They will impose a
positive tax rate (equal to r∗) because the cost to their districts from imposing the tax is smaller
than the beneﬁts from the additional transfers the tax can ﬁnance. They will provide less than the
ﬁrst best level of public goods (g∗(A) rather than gS(A)) because the cost to their districts from
under-provision is smaller than the beneﬁts from the additional transfers the reduction in public
good spending allows. They will increase the government’s debt level (to x∗ from x) because the
future cost to their districts from reducing the government’s bond holdings is smaller than the
beneﬁts from the additional transfers the reduction in bond holdings allows.
The distortions in the tax rate and the public good level are static ineﬃciencies in the sense
23that within any period in which pork is provided aggregate citizen welfare would be higher if the tax
rate were reduced and the public good level increased. These distortions arise because the decisive
majority does not fully internalize the costs of raising taxes or reducing public good spending to
ﬁnance transfers to its members. The distortion in the debt level is a dynamic ineﬃciency in the
sense that the future beneﬁts to citizens from lower debt oﬀset the costs of lower revenues in the
present. The cause of this distortion is “redistributive uncertainty” (Lizzeri 1999). To see this,
suppose that with an initial debt level x the minimum winning coalition reduces bond holdings
by one unit and uses it to ﬁnance transfers to coalition members. This would gain 1/q units for
each legislator in the minimum winning coalition and would lead to a one unit reduction in pork
in the next period (assuming that A∗(x,x ∗) ≥ A). This has an expected cost of only 1/n in the
next period because members of the current minimum winning coalition are not sure if they will
be included in the next period. The critical role of redistributive uncertainty can be appreciated
by noting that the ineﬃciency would disappear if the identity of the minimum winning coalition
were constant through time.
The conclusion that tax rates are too volatile should be interpreted with some care. Conditional
on the tax rate being at least r∗, the public good level being no greater than g∗(A), and the debt
level being no smaller than x∗, the equilibrium policy sequence is indeed eﬃcient.11 Thus, the
statement that tax rates are too volatile should be understood as a comparison between the ﬁrst
best level of volatility (which is zero) and the equilibrium. In a second best sense, the volatility
in equilibrium tax rates is optimal.
Perhaps the most important diﬀerence between the equilibrium and the planner’s solution
is that in the former the long run distribution of debt is stochastic. Consistent with the tax-
smoothing principle, in equilibrium, debt is accumulated when the value of the public good is
high and decumulated when it is low. The planner’s solution displays the same pattern only
when an exogenous limit (smaller than −x) is placed on the amount of bonds the government can
hold (see Aiyagari et al (2002)). It is tempting to suppose that such an ad hoc limit could arise
“naturally” when policies are determined via the political process and our equilibrium analysis
provides support for this idea. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the equilibrium policy
sequence does not equal that which would be chosen by a planner with a set of feasible debt levels
11 As was noted in section 4.2, the equilibrium round one value function v1 is a ﬁxed point of the operator Tx∗
deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 3 ) .
24[x∗,x]. As is clear from equation (23), the equilibrium solves a planning problem with constraints
on the tax rate and public good level as well as on public debt. The inﬂuence of the political
process on policy determination can be captured only if all policy variables are appropriately
constrained. Accordingly, our analysis does not provide a justiﬁcation for imposing a debt limit
on the planner’s problem and declaring the solution a positive prediction.
6 The desirability of a balanced budget requirement
To illustrate the potential usefulness of the theory for policy analysis, we explore its implications for
the desirability of balanced budget requirements. There has been considerable debate in academic
and policy circles concerning this issue.12 Many of the U.S. states have some form of balanced
budget requirement and there is evidence that they do have an eﬀect.13 Proponents argue
that they dampen politicians’ ability to borrow to spend inappropriately. Opponents point out
that they restrict the state’s ability to adjust to revenue shocks and/or spending shocks without
having to raise taxes. Both positions seem reasonable, but to provide sharper policy guidance
it is necessary to understand the features of the environment that determine when the beneﬁts
outweigh the potential costs.
We consider a ﬁscal restraint that requires the legislature to ensure that tax revenues equal
public spending in every period. We assume that in the ﬁrst period the government begins with
no debt, so that spending is just public goods and transfers. We seek to understand when citizens’
welfare will be enhanced by the constraint that public spending be ﬁnanced solely by tax revenues.
Let (rc(A),g c(A)) denote the equilibrium tax rate and public good level when the value of the
public good is A under the balanced budget requirement. Then, following the logic of Proposition







n : B(r,g,0;0) ≥ 0} if A>A ∗(0,0)
(r∗,g∗(A)) if A ≤ A∗(0,0)
.
(32)
Thus, if A ≤ A∗(0,0), the legislature is in the BAU regime and districts receive pork, while if
12 For relevant discussion see Bohn and Inman (1996), Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Niskanen (1992), Poterba
(1994), (1995) and Poterba and von Hagen (1999).
13 For example, Poterba (1994) shows that states with restraints were quicker to reduce spending and/or raise
taxes in response to negative revenue shocks than those without.
25A>A ∗(0,0), the legislature is in the RPM regime. The solution is stationary because government
cannot issue debt or acquire bonds. If vc(A) denotes expected citizen welfare under the balanced
budget requirement given that the current value of the public good is A,t h e n








[u(w(1 − rc(A)),g c(A);A)+
B(rc(A),g c(A),0;0)
n
]dG(A)/(1 − δ). (34)
Let {r1(b,A), g1(b,A), x1(b,A)} be the equilibrium policy functions when there is no balanced
budget requirement, let x∗ be the BAU level of public debt, and let v1(b,A) be the equilibrum
(round one) value function. Starting from a situation in which the government has no debt,
expected citizen welfare in the unconstrained equilibrium is Ev1(0,A). Thus, a balanced budget
requirement will be desirable if and only if Evc(A) >E v 1(0,A).
Our ﬁrst result is that when the revenues raised by the tax rate r∗ are never suﬃcient to cover
the cost of the optimal level of public goods, a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.
Proposition 6: If R(r∗) ≤ pg∗(A), a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.
To see this, recall that the condition of the proposition implies that x∗ must be non-positive,
so that in the BAU region, the winning proposals involve the purchase of bonds. These bond
holdings allow the legislature to lower taxes and provide higher levels of public goods in the long
run. Moreover, the legislature only issues debt in the RPM regime which means that borrowing
will be used only when it will raise aggregate utility. Such borrowing must therefore be socially
beneﬁcial.
An interesting feature of this case, is that under a balanced budget requirement, the legislature
never engages in pork barrel spending. (This follows from the fact that the condition implies that
A∗(0,0) ≤ A.) By contrast, in the unconstrained equilibrium, the legislature does provide pork in
the BAU regime. Thus, the balanced budget requirement is undesirable despite eliminating pork.
This underscores the lesson that there is nothing necessarily undesirable about pork - indeed, in
the eﬃcient solution the government provides pork, redistributing excess revenues from its interest
earnings back to the citizens.
Our second result is the mirror image of the ﬁrst: when the revenues raised by the tax rate r∗
are always suﬃcient to cover the cost of the optimal level of public goods when the tax rate is r∗,
26a balanced budget requirement is desirable.
Proposition 7: If R(r∗) ≥ pg∗(A), a balanced budget requirement is desirable.
To see this, note that with a balanced budget restraint, the equilibrium will involve the tax rate
r∗ and the public good level g∗(A) in every period. Without the restraint, the equilibrium will
involve the legislature immediately borrowing x∗ and using the revenues to ﬁnance extra pork.
The amount x∗ must be suﬃciently large that in future periods there is positive probablity that
the tax rate will exceed r∗ and the public good level will be less than g∗(A). There is no oﬀsetting
beneﬁt, and hence eliminating the ability to borrow, increases citizen welfare.
If R(r∗) ∈ (pg∗(A),pg∗(A)) but x∗ ≤ 0, then the argument underlying Proposition 6 remains
and imposing a balanced budget requirement will be harmful. However, if x∗ > 0 the picture is
murkier because there are oﬀsetting eﬀects from imposing the requirement. On the one hand, the
government does not need to service the debt and hence long run taxes and public good levels
must be lower on average with the requirement. On the other, the government’s ability to smooth
tax rates and public good levels by varying the debt level is lost.
Intuitively, it seems natural to suppose that th el a r g e rt h es i z eo ft h et a xb a s ea sm e a s u r e db y
R(r∗) the more likely is a balanced budget requirement to be desirable. After all, the larger the
tax base, the less the need to borrow to meet desired public good spending and the greater the
debt level that will need to be ﬁnanced when there is no restraint. This idea can be investigated
formally by noting that the size of R(r∗) is determined by the magnitude of the private sector wage
w. From (2), we see that R(r∗)e q u a l spg∗(A)i fa n do n l yi fw =[ pg∗(A)/nr∗εε(1−r∗)ε]
1
1+ε.T h u s ,




1+ε,w em o v et h e
size of the tax base through the interval (pg∗(A),pg∗(A)). Our conjecture is that there must exist
a critical wage w∗ greater than [pg∗(A)/nr∗εε(1−r∗)ε]
1
1+ε but less than [pg∗(A)/nr∗εε(1−r∗)ε]
1
1+ε
such that a balanced budget requirement is desirable if and only w>w ∗. Unfortunately, however,
the argument that this is indeed the case has so far proven elusive.
To summarize: the theory suggests the key determinant of the desirability of a balanced budget
requirement is the size of the tax base relative to the economy’s desired public good spending.
When this size is large, a balanced budget requirement is a good idea and when it is small, the
opposite conclusion holds. The relative size of the tax base will be reﬂected in the magnitude of
the debt level that is chosen in the BAU regime. Thus, the theory supports the common sense
27conclusion that economies with large and perpetual deﬁcits should introduce balanced budget
requirements.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a dynamic theory of public spending, taxation and debt. The theory
brings together ideas from the optimal taxation and political economy literatures. From the
former, the theory adopts the basic framework underlying the tax smoothing approach to ﬁscal
policy. From the latter, the theory employs the legislative bargaining approach to modelling
policy-making and draws on ideas in the political economy of deﬁcits literature. The result is a
tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that yields a rich set of predictions concerning the
dynamics of ﬁscal policy and permits a rigorous analysis of the normative properties of equilibrium
policies.
The empirical predictions of the theory are consistent with the fact that historically the
debt/GDP ratio in the U.S. and the U.K. tends to have increased in periods of high govern-
ment spending needs (such as wars) and decreased in periods of low needs (Barro (1979), (1986),
and (1987)). The theory is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Bohn (1998) who studies the re-
lationship between the U.S. primary surplus (tax revenues minus non-interest expenditures) and
the debt/GDP ratio. He ﬁnds that this relationship is positive and, further, that it is non-linear
and increasing. Intuitively, the idea is that the higher the debt level, the more legislators rein in
spending and/or increase taxes. Our theory delivers this prediction in the sense that an increase in
the debt level always increases the primary surplus and, moreover, increases it more when the debt
level is high enough to put the legislature in the RPM regime.14 While these predictions are also
consistent with the tax smoothing paradigm, our theory does not require either the assumption
that policy is chosen by a benevolent planner or that the government faces an ad hoc debt limit.
In sharp contrast to the tax smoothing paradigm, the theory is potentially able to explain
14 In our model, the primary surplus PS(b,A)i st h ed i ﬀerence between tax revenues and spending on the public
good and pork. Using the budget constraint, we may write this as PS(b,A)=( 1+ρ)b − x1(b,A). For a given A,
consider a small increase ∆b in b. If A<A ∗(b,x∗) and the legislature is in the BAU regime, then x1(b,A)=x∗
and ∆PS(b,A)/∆b =( 1+ρ). On the other hand, if A>A ∗(b,x∗) and the legislature is in the RPM regime,
then ∆PS(b,A)/∆b =( 1+ρ) − ∆x1(b,A)/∆b which exceeds 1 + ρ since x1(b,A) is decreasing in b.I nb o t hc a s e s ,
therefore, the relationship between the primary surplus and debt is positive, but the eﬀect is larger when debt is
h i g h e r .W eh a v en o tp r o v e nt h a ti nt h eR P Mr e g i m ex1(b,A) is concave and so we cannot conclude that primary
s u r p l u si sg l o b a l l yc o n v e xi nb. However, this is not what Bohn (1998) shows. In one speciﬁcation, he considers
a piecewise linear regression with a cutpoint at the average level of debt b: he shows that the linear intercept for
b ≥ b is higher than for b<b.
28why countries have very diﬀerent average debt/GDP ratios (see Alesina and Perotti (1995) for
discussion). In the model, this variation could arise from diﬀerences in the level of debt that is
chosen in the BAU regime (x∗). An increase in this debt level serves to shift the support of the
debt distribution to the right. As we have noted, x∗ is determined by the size of an economy’s tax
base relative to its desired public good spending. Diﬀerences in the relative size of the tax base
may arise even in very similar economies, if (say) the elasticity of labor supply varies because of
diﬀerent labor market insititutions or social welfare arrangements. Alternatively, diﬀerences in x∗
could reﬂect the fact that diﬀerent political institutions translate into diﬀerences in the required
majority to pass legislation.15
The theory also provides novel predictions on the dynamic evolution of the composition of
public spending. It is of course diﬃcult to empirically distinguish spending on national public
goods and pork, so directly testing whether the allocation of spending follows the dynamic pattern
suggested by the model may be problematic. However, voting behavior might be used to test the
model. According to the theory, winning coalitions on budget bills should be minimal in periods
of BAU, but should turn to super-majorities in the presence of exceptional events such as wars or
natural disasters.
The normative analysis provides a clean account of how politically determined policy choices
diverge from eﬃcient policies in an environment that incorporates the key assumptions of the
tax smoothing theory of ﬁscal policy. Equally importantly, the framework permits a non-trivial
analysis of an important policy question - namely, is a ﬁscal restraint in the form of a balanced
budget requirement desirable? Obviously, such restraints are never optimal in a model in which
policy is chosen by a planner because they limit the available policy options. The theory suggests
that the key determinant of the desirability of a balanced budget requirement is the size of the tax
base relative to the economy’s desired public good spending. When this size is large, a balanced
budget requirement is a good idea and when it is small, the opposite conclusion holds.
There are numerous ways the theory might usefully be extended. One important extension
would be to introduce cyclical ﬂuctuations in tax revenues due to the business cycle. This could
be achieved by specifying a stochastic process for the private sector wage. One could then derive
predictions concerning the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy. While the tax smoothing paradigm
15 Recall that r∗ depends negatively on q a n dh e n c et h es i z eo ft h et a xb a s ea sm e a s u r e db yR(r∗) is decreasing
in q.
29suggests that deﬁcits might be observed in recessions and surpluses in booms, observed ﬁscal pol-
icy is often procyclical (Alesina and Tabellini (2005)). It would be interesting to know what the
theory developed here predicts. A further important set of extensions concerns the implications
of diﬀerent political institutions for the dynamics of ﬁscal policy. For example, one could model
decision making in a bicameral legislative system or a presidential system with veto power. Un-
derstanding how these diﬀerent institutions impact the equilibrium and its dynamics would be
helpful in interpreting cross-country (or cross-state) variation in the time series on debt and other
key ﬁscal variables (see Woo (2003)). Finally, it would be interesting to study the implications of
diﬀerent decision-making procedures or consitutional rules governing policy-making (see von Ha-
gen (2002) for discussion). For example, suppose that tax rates were determined before spending
decisions or that tax increases must be approved by a majority of voters in a referendum. Under-
standing how these diﬀerent budgetary rules or protocols impact ﬁscal policy could contribute to
debates concerning piecemeal institutional reform.
30References
Acemoglu, D., (2003), “Why not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conﬂict, Commitment
and Politics,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 620-652.
Aiyagari, R., A. Marcet, T. Sargent and J. Seppala, (2002), “Optimal Taxation without
State-Contingent Debt,” Journal of Political Economy, 110, 1220-1254.
Alesina, A., (2000), “The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 3-19.
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti, (1995), “The Political Economy of Budget Deﬁcits,” IMF Staﬀ
Papers, 1-31.
Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini, (1990), “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deﬁcits and Government
Debt,” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 403-414.
Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini, (2005), “Why is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical?” NBER
Working Paper #11600.
Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks, (2005), Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure,
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Baron, D., (1991), “Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Con-
trol,” American Journal of Political Science, 35, 57-90.
Baron D. and J. Ferejohn, (1989), “Bargaining in Legislatures,” American Political Science
Review, 83, 1181-1206.
Barro, R., (1979), “On the Determination of the Public Debt,” Journal of Political Economy,
87, 940-971.
Barro, R., (1986), “U.S. Deﬁcits since World War I,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
88(1), 195-222.
Barro, R., (1987), “Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices, and Budget Deﬁcits in the
United Kingdom, 1701-1918,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, 221-247.
Battaglini, M. and S. Coate, (2005), “Ineﬃciency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic
Analysis,” NBER Working Paper #11495.
Besley, T. and S. Coate, (1998), “Sources of Ineﬃciency in a Representative Democracy: A
Dynamic Analysis,” American Economic Review, 88(1), 139-156.
Bohn, H., (1998), “The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Deﬁcits,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113(3), 949-963.
Bohn, H. and R. Inman, (1996), “Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deﬁcits: Evidence
from the U.S. States,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 45, 13-76.
Brennan, G. and J. Buchanan, (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal
Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coate, S. and S. Morris, (1999), “Policy Persistence,” American Economic Review, 89, 1327-
1336.
31Hassler, J., Rodriguez Mora, J., Storesletten, K. and F. Zilibotti, (2003), “The Survival of
the Welfare State,” American Economic Review, 93(1), 87-112.
Inman, R., (1990), “Public Debts and Fiscal Politics: How to Decide?” American Economic
Review, 80(2), 81-85.
Leblanc, W., J. Snyder and M. Tripathi, (2000), “Majority-Rule Bargaining and the Under
Provision of Public Investment Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 75, 21-47.
Lizzeri, A., (1999), “Budget Deﬁcits and Redistributive Politics,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 66(4), 909-928.
Lucas, R. and N. Stokey, (1983), “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy
without Capital,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, 55-93.
Niskanen, W., (1992), “The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 6(2), 13-24.
Persson, T. and L. Svensson, (1989), “Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deﬁcit:
Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 325-345.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Poterba, J., (1994), “State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Eﬀects of Budgetary Institutions
and Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 102, 799-821.
Poterba, J., (1995), “Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the States,”
National Tax Journal, 48(3), 329-336.
Poterba, J. and J. von Hagen, eds., (1999), Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rockafellar, R. T., (1970), Convex Analysis, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Stokey, N., R. Lucas and E. Prescott, (1989), Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Velasco, A., (2000), “Debts and Deﬁcits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking,” Journal of
Public Economics, 76, 105-125.
von Hagen, J., (2002), “Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance,” The
Economic and Social Review, 33(3), 263-284.
von Hagen, J. and I. Harden, (1995), “Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Disci-
pline,” European Economic Review, 39, 771-779.
Weingast, B, K. Shepsle and C. Johnsen, (1981), “The Political Economy of Beneﬁts and
Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics,” Journal of Political Economy, 89,
642-664.
Woo, J., (2003), “Economic, Political, and Institutional Determinants of Public Deﬁcits,”
Journal of Public Economics, 87, 387-426.
328A p p e n d i x
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by establishing the claim made in the text that, given that utility is transferable, the
proposer is eﬀectively making decisions to maximize the collective utility of q representatives under
the assumption that they get to divide any surplus revenues among their districts.
Lemma A.1: Let {rτ(b,A), gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A), sτ(b,A)}T
τ=1 be an equilibrium with associated value
function v1(b,A).T h e n ,f o ra l ls t a t e s(b,A), the tax rate-public good-public debt triple (rτ(b,A),
gτ(b,A), xτ(b,A)) proposed in any round τ solves the problem
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
q + δEv1(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
Moreover, the transfer to coalition members is given by
sτ(b,A)=vτ+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A);A) − δEv1(xτ(b,A),A 0).
Proof: We begin with proposal round T.L e t ( b,A) ∈ Z be given. Multiplying the objective
function through by q,w en e e dt os h o wt h a ti f( rT,s T,g T,x T) solves the round T proposer’s
problem when the state is (b,A), (rT,g T,x T) solves the problem
max(r,g,x) q[u(w(1 − r),g;A)+δEv1(x,A0)] + B(r,g,x;b)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]
, (35)




u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEv1(x,A)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEv1(x,A) ≥ vT+1(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
It is easy to see that sT = vT+1(b,A)−δEv1(xT,A 0)−u(w(1−rT),g T;A), for if this were not the
case it would follow from the deﬁnition of vT+1(b,A)t h a tsT > 0 and we could create a preferred
proposal by just reducing sT. It follows that we can write the proposer’s payoﬀ as
q [u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv1(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,g T,x T;b).
33Now suppose that (rT,g T,x T) does not solve problem (35). Let (r0,g0,x 0) solve problem (35)
and s0 = vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − r0),g0;A) − δEv1(x0,A 0). Then, the proposer’s payoﬀ under the
proposal (r0,g0,x 0,s 0)i sq[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEv1(x0,A 0)]+B(r0,g0,x 0;b). By construction, the
incentive constraint is satisﬁed and, by deﬁnition of vT+1(b,A), s0 ≥ 0. Moreover, x0 ∈ [x,x].
Finally, note that
B(r0,g0,x 0;b) − (q − 1)s0 =( q − 1)[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEv1(x0,A 0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b)
−(q − 1)vT+1(b,A) ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (r0,g0,x 0) solves problem (35) and the deﬁnition
of vT+1(b,A). It follows that (r0,g0,x 0,s 0) is feasible for the proposer’s problem and yields a higher
payoﬀ than (rT,g T,x T,s T) - a contradiction.
Now consider the round T − 1 proposer’s problem
max
(r,g,x,s)
u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEv1(x,A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEv1(x,A0) ≥ vT(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
(36)
From what we know about the round T proposer’s problem,




where (rT,g T,x T) solves problem (35).
We need to show that if (rT−1,s T−1,g T−1,x T−1) is the solution to the round T −1 proposer’s
problem, (rT−1,g T−1,x T−1) solves problem (35) and
sT−1 = vT(b,A) − u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A) − δEv1(xT−1,A 0).
The result would follow from our earlier argument if we could show that
sT−1 = vT(b,A) − u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A) − δEv1(xT−1,A 0),
so suppose that sT−1 >v T(b,A)−u(w(1−rT−1),g T−1;A)−δEv1(xT−1,A 0). Then it must be the
case that sT−1 = 0, or we could obtain a preferred proposal by simply reducing sT−1. It follows
that
vT(b,A) <u (w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv1(xT−1,A 0). (37)




s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x].
Now consider the proposal (rT,g T,x T,
B(rT,gT,xT;b)
n ). Clearly, this proposal satisﬁes all the
constraints of the proposer’s problem. The payoﬀ to the proposer under this policy is
q[u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv1(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,g T,x T;b) − (q − 1)vT(b,A).
From (37), this payoﬀ is strictly larger than
q[u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv1(xT,A)] + B(rT,x T,g T;b)
−(q − 1)[u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv1(xT−1,A)].
The payoﬀ to the proposer under the optimal policy (rT−1,g T−1,x T−1)i s
u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+B(rT−1,x T−1,g T−1;b)+δEv1(xT−1,A).
Thus, it must be the case that
u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+B(rT−1,x T−1,g T−1;b)+δEv1(xT−1,A 0)
>q [u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv1(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,x T,g T;b)
−(q − 1)[u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv1(xT−1,A 0)],
implying that
q[u(w(1 − rT−1),g T−1;A)+δEv1(xT−1,A 0)] + B(rT−1,x T−1,g T−1;b)
>q [u(w(1 − rT),g T;A)+δEv1(xT,A 0)] + B(rT,x T,g T;b).
This contradicts the fact that (rT,g T,x T) solves problem (35).
Application of the same logic to proposal rounds τ = T − 2,...,1 implies the lemma. ¥
The argument in the text together with Lemma A.1 implies that for any proposal round τ if
A>A ∗(b,x∗)












35while if A ≤ A∗(b,x∗)
(rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) = (r∗,g∗(A),x ∗).
Turning to the equilibrium transfers, if A ≤ A∗(b,x∗) it follows that for all proposal rounds










B(r∗,g∗(A),x ∗;b)/n τ =1 ,...,T − 1
vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − r∗,g∗(A);A) − δEv1(x∗,A 0) τ = T
.
If A>A ∗(b,x∗) it follows that for all proposal rounds τ =1 ,...,T− 1w eh a v et h a t
vτ+1(b,A)=m a x {u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n
+ δEv1(x;A0):B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]}
= u(w(1 − rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A);A)+δEv1(xτ(b,A),A 0).
Thus, by Lemma A.1, sτ(b,A)=0 . ¥
8.2 Properties of the equilibrium policy functions
We need to show that when A>A ∗(b,x∗) , the tax rate, public debt level and the level of the
public good depend positively on the value of the public good (A), the tax rate and level of public
debt depend positively on the current level of debt (b) and the level of the public good depends
negatively on b. From Proposition 1 we know that when A>A ∗(b,x∗), the equilibrium tax
rate-public good-public debt triple (rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) solve
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n + δEv1(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x]
.
Moreover, from the discussion in the text, (rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) is implicitly deﬁned by
equations (14), (15) and (16).
Lemma A.2: Let b ∈ [x,x] and let A0,A 1 ∈ [A,A] be such that A∗(b,x∗) <A 0 <A 1.T h e n ,i t
is the case that gτ(b,A0) <g τ(b,A1) and rτ(b,A0) <r τ(b,A1). Moreover, it is also the case that
xτ(b,A0) ≤ xτ(b,A1) with strict inequality if xτ(b,A0) < x.
36Proof: We begin by showing that gτ(b,A0) <g τ(b,A1). Let ϕ(A0;b,A)b et h ev a l u eo ft h e
objective function for the problem when the state is A0 and the policies are those that are optimal





T h e n ,w eh a v et h a tϕ(A0;b,A0) > ϕ(A0;b,A1)a n dϕ(A1;b,A1) > ϕ(A1;b,A0) (the strict inequal-
ity follows from the fact that the problem has a unique solution).
Moreover, using the deﬁnition of the indirect utility function u(w(1 − r),g;A)( s e ee q u a t i o n
(1)) and letting ∆A = A1 − A0,w ec a nw r i t eϕ(A0;b,A0)=ϕ(A1;b,A0) − ∆Agτ(b,A0)a n d
ϕ(A0;b,A1)=ϕ(A1;b,A1) − ∆Agτ(b,A1). Since ϕ(A0;b,A0) > ϕ(A0;b,A1), this means that
ϕ(A1;b,A0) − ∆Agτ(b,A0) > ϕ(A1;b,A1) − ∆Agτ(b,A1), and hence
∆A[gτ(b,A0) − gτ(b,A1)] < ϕ(A1;b,A0) − ϕ(A1;b,A1) < 0.
Since ∆A>0, this implies that gτ(b,A0) <g τ(b,A1) as required.
We next show that rτ(b,A0) <r τ(b,A1). Suppose to the contrary that rτ(b,A0) ≥ rτ(b,A1).
Then the ﬁrst order condition for x and the concavity of v1 imply that xτ(b,A0) ≥ xτ(b,A1). But
then it follows that
B(rτ(b,A0),g τ(b,A0),x τ(b,A0);b) >B (rτ(b,A1),g τ(b,A1),x τ(b,A1);b)=0
which is a contradiction.
Finally, we show that xτ(b,A0) ≤ xτ(b,A1) with strict inequality if xτ(b,A0) < x. This follows
immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for x and the concavity of v1 given that rτ(b,A0) <
rτ(b,A1). ¥
Lemma A.3: Let b0,b 1 ∈ [x,x] be such that b0 <b 1 and let A ∈ [A,A] be such that A∗(b0,x ∗) <A .
Then, it is the case that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A) and gτ(b0,A) >g τ(b1,A). Moreover, it is also the
case that xτ(b0,A) ≤ xτ(b1,A) with strict inequality if xτ(b0,A) < x.
Proof: We ﬁrst show that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A). Suppose to the contrary that rτ(b0,A) ≥
rτ(b1,A). Then the ﬁrst order conditions for g and x and the concavity of v1 imply that gτ(b0,A) ≤
gτ(b1,A)a n dxτ(b0,A) ≥ xτ(b1,A) .B u tt h e ni tf o l l o w st h a t
B(rτ(b0,A),g τ(b0,A),x τ(b0,A);b0) >B (rτ(b1,A),g τ(b1,A),x τ(b1,A);b1)=0
37which is a contradiction.
The fact that gτ(b0,A) >g τ(b1,A) follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for g
and the fact that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A). In addition, the fact that xτ(b0,A) ≤ xτ(b1,A) with strict
inequality if xτ(b0,A) < x follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition for x, the concavity
of v1 and the fact that rτ(b0,A) <r τ(b1,A). ¥
8.3 Proof of Proposition 2





.L e tF∗ be the subset of these functions that are continuous and concave in x for




ρ ,x]a n dv ∈ F∗ consider the maximization problem
max(r,g,x) u(w(1 − r),g;A)+
B(r,g,x;b)
n + δEv(x,A0)
s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, r ≥ r∗, g ≤ g∗(A)&x ∈ [z,x]
.
For all µ>0, let
Xµ




+ δEv(x,A0):x ∈ [z,x]}
and let xµ
z(v) be the largest element of the compact set Xµ
z (v). Notice that xµ
z(v) is non-increasing
in µ.
Suppose that (r,g,x) is a solution to the maximization problem. It is straightforward to show
that (i) if A ≤ A∗(b,xn
z(v)) then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and x ∈ Xn
z (v) ∩ {x : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0};
(ii) if A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(v)),A ∗(b,xq
z(v))] then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) = 0; and (iii)
if A>A ∗(b,xq
z(v)) (r,g,x) is uniquely deﬁned and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover,
r>r ∗ and g<g ∗(A). Note that in all cases the tax rate and public good level are uniquely
deﬁned.




ρ ,x], deﬁne the operator Tz : F∗ → F as follows:












It can be veriﬁed that Tz(v) ∈ F∗ and that Tz is a contraction. Thus, there exists a unique
ﬁxed point vz(b,A) which is continuous and concave in b for all A.T h i sﬁxed point satisﬁes the
38functional equation













Let (b,A) be given and let (r,g,x) denote an optimal policy. By Step 1, we have that (i) if
A ≤ A∗(b,xn
z(vz)) then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and x ∈ Xn
z (vz) ∩ {x : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0}; (ii)
if A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(vz)),A ∗(b,xq
z(vz))] then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) = 0; and (iii)
if A>A ∗(b,xq
z(vz)) (r,g,x)i su n i q u e l yd e ﬁned and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover,
r>r ∗ and g<g ∗(A). Again, in all cases the tax rate and public good level is uniquely deﬁned.
Let these be given by (rz(b,A),g z(b,A)) - these are also continuous functions on the state space.
Step 3: For any z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)







Proof: It suﬃces to show that for any v ∈ F∗, the function ETz(v)(·,A) is strictly concave on
the set {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) < A}. Since Tz(v) ∈ F∗, we know already that the function
Tz(v)(·,A)i sc o n c a v ef o ra l lA.W e n o w s h o w t h a t f o r a l l A,t h ef u n c t i o nTz(v)(·,A)i ss t r i c t l y
concave on {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) <A }. In this case, the budget constraint is strictly binding
and gz(b,A) <g ∗(A), rz(b,A) >r ∗. We can therefore write:












Take two points b1 and b2 in the set {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) <A } and assume that b1 <b 2.L e tλ
be a point in the interval [0,1]. Deﬁne (ri,g i,x i) to be the optimal policies associated with (bi,A)
for i =1 ,2 (as noted above these are unique). Let bλ = λb1 +( 1− λ)b2, rλ = λr1 +( 1− λ)r2,
gλ = λg1 +( 1− λ)g2 and xλ = λx1 +( 1− λ)x2.S i n c e v(x,A0)+x/n is weakly concave in x,






u(w(1 − r1),g 1;A)
+
B(r1,g1,x1;b1)








u(w(1 − r2),g 2;A)
+
B(r2,g2,x2;b2)








Since R(r)i sc o n c a v ei nr,w eh a v et h a tB(rλ,g λ,x λ;bλ) > 0 and, in addition, xλ ∈ [z,x].
Therefore:

















We conclude that λTz(v)(b1,A)+( 1− λ)Tz(v)(b2,A) <T z(v)(bλ,A)a sr e q u i r e d .
Now take any two points b1 and b2 in the set {b ∈ [x,x]:A∗(b,xq
z(v)) < A} and assume that













































Step 4: For any z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x], let
M(z)=a r gm a x {
x
q




Then there exists z∗ ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x] such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗).
Proof: The result follows from Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem if M(z) is non-empty, upper
hemi-continuous, and convex and compact-valued. We have:
Claim: M(z) is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and convex and compact-valued.
40Proof: Let Fz denote the set of all bounded and continuous real valued functions ϕ(·,·,·)d e ﬁned
over the compact set [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)




.D e ﬁne the operator:












It is easy to verify that Ψ maps Fz into itself and is a contraction. Thus, it has a unique ﬁx-
point ϕ∗ = Ψ(ϕ∗)w h i c hb e l o n g st oFz.N o w n o t e t h a t f o ra n y z ∈ [
R(r∗)−pg∗(A)
ρ ,x], vz(b,A)=
ϕ∗(z,b,A). To see this, note that for any given z, ϕ∗(z,b,A) ∈ F∗,s ow ec a nd e ﬁne Tz (ϕ∗(z,b,A)).
The deﬁnition of ϕ∗, however, implies Tz (ϕ∗(z,b,A)) = ϕ∗(z,b,A). Since Tz has a unique ﬁxpoint,
it must be that vz(b,A)=ϕ∗(z,b,A).
Given this, we conclude that vz(b,A) is continuous in z and the Theorem of the Maximum
then implies that M(z) is non-empty, upper hemi-continuous, and compact-valued. Convexity of
M(z) follows from the fact that Evz(x,A) is weakly concave. ¥
Step 5: Let z∗ be such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗). Then, x
q
z∗(vz∗)=z∗.
Proof: By deﬁnition, x
q
z∗(vz∗) is the largest element in the set X
q
z∗(vz∗). By construction, z∗













z∗(vz∗), then it must be the case that z∗ <x
q











This implies that the expected value function Evz∗(·,A) is linear on the interval [z∗,x
q
z∗(vz∗)].
However, we know that
x
q
z∗(vz∗) >z ∗ ≥
R(r∗) − pg∗(A)
ρ
which implies that pg∗(A)+ρx
q




z∗(vz∗)) < A.B y




z∗(vz∗)] such that for all
x in this interval A∗(x,x
q
z∗(vz∗)) < A. But by Step 3, the expected value function Evz∗(·,A)i s
strictly concave on the interval [x0,x
q
z∗(vz∗)] - a contradiction.
41Step 6: Let z∗ be such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗). Then, the function vz∗(·,A)i sd i ﬀerentiable for all b











n )i f A>A ∗(b,z∗)
−(
1+ρ
n )i f A<A ∗(b,z∗)
.
Proof: Let A ∈ [A,A]a n dl e txo be given. By Step 5, we know that x
q
z∗(vz∗)=z∗ which
immediately implies that xn
z∗(vz∗)=z∗.S u p p o s eﬁrst that A<A ∗(xo,z∗). Then, we have that












Now suppose that A>A ∗(xo,z∗). Then, we know that the budget constraint is binding, and
that the constraints r ≥ r∗ and g ≤ g∗(A) are not binding. Thus, we have that in a neighborhood
of xo that







n + δEvz∗ (y,A0)













+ δEvz∗ (xz∗(xo,A),A 0).
Notice that (rz∗(xo,A),g(x),x z∗(xo,A)) is a feasible policy when the initial debt level is x so that







p )2 < 0
42The second derivative property implies that η(x) is strictly concave. It follows from Theorem




















which implies that αnAgz∗(xo,A)α−1 = p[
1−rz∗(xo,A)










Step 7: Let z∗ be such that z∗ ∈ M(z∗). Then, the following constitutes an equilibrium. For
each proposal round τ
(rτ(b,A),g τ(b,A),x τ(b,A)) = (rz∗(b,A),g z∗(b,A),x z∗(b,A));
for proposal rounds τ =1 ,...,T − 1
sτ(b,A)=B(rz∗(b,A),g z∗(b,A),x z∗(b,A);b)/n;
and for proposal round T
sT(b;A)=vT+1(b,A) − u(w(1 − rz∗(b,A)),g z∗(b,A);A) − δEvz∗(xz∗(b,A),A 0);
where













Proof: Given these proposals, the legislators’ round one value function is given by vz∗(b,A). This
follows from the fact that




Similarly, the round τ =2 ,...,T legislators’ value function vτ(b,A)i sg i v e nb yvz∗(b,A). It follows
from Steps 3 and 4 that the value function vz∗(b,A) has the properties required for an equilibrium









u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEvz∗(x;A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEvz∗(x;A0) ≥ vz∗(b;A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
and (ii) that for proposal round T the proposal




u(w(1 − r),g;A)+B(r,g,x;b) − (q − 1)s + δEvz∗(x;A0)
s.t. u(w(1 − r),g;A)+s + δEvz∗(x;A0) ≥ vT+1(b,A),
B(r,g,x;b) ≥ (q − 1)s, s ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
We show only (i) - the argument for (ii) being analogous.
Consider some proposal round τ =1 ,...,T − 1. Let (b,A) be given. To simplify notation, let










s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0&x ∈ [x,x],
and that b s = vz∗(b,A)−u(w(1−b r),b g;A)−δEvz∗(b x;A0). Suppose that (b r,b g,b x,b s)d o e sn o ts o l v et h e
round τ proposer’s problem. Then there exist some (r0,g0,x 0,s 0) which achieves a higher value of
the proposer’s objective function. We know that s0 ≥ vz∗(b;A)−u(w(1−r0),g0;A)−δEvz∗(x0;A0).
Thus, we have that the value of the proposer’s objective function satisﬁes
u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+B(r0,g0,x 0;b) − (q − 1)s0 + δEvz∗(x0;A0)
≤ q[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEvz∗(x0;A0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b).
44But since B(r0,g0,x 0;b) ≥ 0, we know that
q[u(w(1 − r0),g0;A)+δEvz∗(x0;A0)] + B(r0,g0,x 0;b)
≤ q[u(w(1 − b r),b g;A)+δEvz∗(b x;A0)] + B(b r,b g,b x;b).
But the right hand side of the inequality is the value of the proposer’s objective function under
the proposal (b r,b g,b x,b s). This therefore contradicts the assumption that (r0,g0,x 0,s 0)a c h i e v e sa
higher value for the proposer’s problem. ¥












two equilibria with associated round one value functions v0(b,A)a n dv1(b,A). Let x∗
0 and x∗
1 be
the debt levels chosen in the BAU regimes of the two equilibria and suppose that x∗
0 ≤ x∗
1.W ew i l l
demonstrate that it must be the case that x∗
0 = x∗
1. To do this, we will show that the assumption
that x∗
0 <x ∗
1 results in a contradiction.
As in the proof of Proposition 2, deﬁne the operator Tz : F∗ → F as follows:













We know that Tz(v) ∈ F∗ and that Tz is a contraction. Moreover, for i ∈ {0,1},w eh a v et h a t
Tx∗
i(vi)=vi.
Now let v ∈ F∗ be such that for all b, v(·,A)i sd i ﬀerentiable at b for almost all A and for each
















k=1 converges to vi.W e n o w
establish the following result:
Claim: Let ρ0 ∈ (0,ρ). Then, for all k and for any x ∈ [x∗














Proof: The proof proceeds via induction. Consider ﬁrst the claim for k =1 .R e c a l lf r o mS t e p1




s.t. B(r,g,x;b) ≥ 0, g ≤ g∗(A), r ≥ r∗, x ∈ [z,x]
,
45then: (i) if A ≤ A∗(b,xn
z(v)) then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and x ∈ Xn
z (v)∩{x : B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) ≥ 0};
(ii) if A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(v)),A ∗(b,xq
z(v))] then (r,g)=( r∗,g∗(A)) and B(r∗,g∗(A),x;b) = 0; and
(iii) if A>A ∗(b,xq
z(v)) (r,g,x)i su n i q u e l yd e ﬁned, the budget constraint is binding, r>r ∗ and
g<g ∗(A). Denote the solution in case (iii) as (rz(b,A;v),g z(b,A;v),x z(b,A;v)).
















If A ∈ (A∗(b,xn
z(v)),A ∗(b,xq
z(v))], then
Tz(v)(b,A)=u(w(1 − r∗),g∗(A);A)+δEv(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)b − R(r∗),A 0)




= −δEv0(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)b − R(r∗),A 0)(1 + ρ).
Notice for future reference that in this range, x ∈ (xn
z(v),x q
z(v)] and hence




























n(1 − rz(b,A;v)(1 + ε))
(1 + ρ).
































1 − rz(b,A;v)(1 + ε)
]dG(A).
46Applying this to the problem at hand, let x ∈ [x∗




1+ρ0 . Then, to prove



















































It is straightforward to verify that the following four conditions are suﬃcient for this inequality
to hold: (i) A∗(x,xn
x∗








0(v)), (iii) for all







∂v(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)x − R(r∗),A 0)
∂b
≥− E
∂v(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)f(x) − R(r∗),A 0)
∂b
,














We will now show that these four conditions are satisﬁed. We begin with condition (i). If it
were not satisﬁed, then A∗(x,xn
x∗
1(v)) ≥ A∗(f(x),x n
x∗




























0.G i v e nt h ed e ﬁnition of xn
x∗

















1(v) - a contradiction.
Condition (ii) can be established in the same way and condition (iii) follows directly from the
assumption that v(·,A) is concave. This leaves condition (iv). From the ﬁrst order conditions





















































0) < 0, which is a contradiction.












































































































Following the same approach as above, for this inequality to hold, the following four conditions
are suﬃcient: (i) A∗(x,xn
x∗
1(v1


























k(pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)f(x) − R(r∗),A 0)
∂b
,



















48We will again show that these four conditions are satisﬁed. We begin with condition (i). If
it were not satisﬁe d ,t h e ni tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tA∗(x,xn
x∗
1(v1







k) − (1 + ρ)x ≥ xn
x∗
0(v0














































We can use similar logic to conclude that condition (ii) is satisﬁed. Condition (iii) follows
immediately from the induction step since we have that
pg∗(A)+( 1+ρ)x − R(r∗) − [x∗
1 − x∗
0] >p g ∗(A)+( 1+ρ)f(x) − R(r∗).























































































































1+ρ0 which is a contradiction. If xx∗
0(f(x),A;v0
k)=x,




k) and the same contradiction arises.
¥






is a sequence of concave and diﬀerentiable functions such
that for all x limk→∞ E(vi
k(x,A)) = E(vi(x,A)). Thus, by Theorem 25.7 of Rockafellar (1970),


































































0, which contradicts the fact that x∗
1 >x ∗
0.
It follows that x∗
0 = x∗












8.5 Proof of Proposition 4
It is easy to prove that the transition function H(b,x) has the Feller Property and that it is
monotonic in b (see Ch. 12.4 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989) for deﬁnitions). By Theorem
12.12 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989), therefore, the result follows if the following “mixing
condition” is satisﬁed:
Mixing Condition: There exists an ²>0 and m ≥ 1,s u c ht h a tHm(x,x∗) ≥ ² and 1 −




50Intuitively, this condition requires that if we start out with the highest level of debt x,t h e nw e
w i l le n du pa tx∗ with probability greater than ² after m p e r i o d s ,w h i l ei fw es t a r to u tw i t ht h e
lowest level of debt x, we will end up above x∗ with probability greater than ² in m periods. For
any b ∈ [x,x]a n dA ∈ [A,A]d e ﬁne the sequence hφm(b,A)i as follows: φ0(b,A)=b, φm+1(b,A)=
x1(φm(b,A),A). Thus, φm(b,A) is the level of debt if the debt level were b at time 0 and the shock
was A in periods 1 through m. Recall that, by assumption, there exists some positive constant
ξ > 0, such that for any pair of realizations satisfying A<A 0, the diﬀerence G(A0)−G(A)i sa tl e a s t
as big as ξ(A0 −A). This implies that for any b ∈ [x,x], Hm(b,φm(b,A+λ))−Hm(b,φm(b,A)) ≥
ξmλm for all λ such that 0 < λ < A − A. Using this observation, we can prove:
Claim 1: For m suﬃciently large, Hm(x,x∗) > 0.
Proof: It suﬃces to show that for m suﬃciently large A∗(φm(x,A),x ∗) >A .T h e n ,f o ra n ys u c h













≥ G(A∗(φm(x,A + λm),x ∗))
£
Hm−1(x,φm−1(x,A + λm)) − Hm−1(x,φm−1(x,A))
¤
≥ G(A∗(φm(x,A + λm),x ∗))(ξλm)
m−1 > 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that for all m we have that A∗(φm(x,A),x ∗) ≤ A. Then, it must
b et h ec a s et h a tt h es e q u e n c ehφm(x,A)i is decreasing. To see this note that since r1(b,A)i s
increasing in A we have that
1 − r1(φk(x,A),A)






1 − r1(φk(x,A),A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A).
But equations (15) and (20) imply that:
1 − r1(φk−1(x,A),A)






1 − r1(φk(x,A),A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A). (40)
Since r1(b,A)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb and A,t h i si m p l i e sφk−1(x,A) > φk(x,A).
We can therefore assume without loss of generality that φm(x,A) converges to some ﬁnite
β ≥ x. We now prove that this yields a contradiction. Taking the limit as m →∞ ,c o n t i n u i t yo f
51r1(·,A) would imply limk→∞ r1(φk(x,A),A)=r1(φ∞(x,A),A) for all A. Using condition (40):
1 − r1(φ∞(x,A),A)






1 − r1(φ∞(x,A),A)(1 + ε)
)dG(A)
which is impossible since r1(φ∞(x,A),A) is strictly increasing in A.W ec o n c l u d et h e r e f o r et h a t
for m suﬃciently large A∗(φm(x,A),x ∗) >A , which yields the result. ¥
Next, we can establish:
Claim 2: For all m ≥ 2, 1 − Hm(x,x ∗) ≥ G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 [1 − G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))].
Proof: With probability G(A∗(x,x ∗)) the level of debt chosen in period 1 is x∗ when the initial
level of debt is x; so with probability G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 the level of debt is x∗ for the
ﬁrst m − 1 periods. Given this, the probability that the level of debt is larger than x∗ in period
m is at least G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 [1 − G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))]. ¥
These two Claims imply that the Mixing Condition is satisﬁed if q<n .T os e et h i s ,c h o o s em
suﬃciently large so that Hm(x,x∗) > 0. This is always possible by Claim 1. Now let
² =m i n
©
G(A∗(x,x ∗))G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))m−2 [1 − G(A∗(x∗,x ∗))];Hm(x,x∗)
ª





(22)) and A∗(x,x ∗) >A ∗(x∗,x ∗) >A .T h u s ,²>0 and the condition is satisﬁed.
If q = n, then the Mixing Condition does not hold, but the proposition remains true. Equation
(22) implies that x∗ = x.S i n c eA∗(x,x) ≥ A, we know that when the initial debt level is x,t h e nt h e
level of debt never changes and hence the Mixing Condition is violated. However, the distribution
that puts point mass on x is an invariant distribution. Moreover, by Claim 1, we know that there
exists a ²>0a n dam such that for any initial b, the probability that x = x in the next m periods
is at least ². So the probability that x is never equal to x in the next j·m periods is not larger than
(1 − ²)
j. We conclude that the probability that x is never equal to x, is zero: limj→∞ (1 − ²)
j =0 .
Thus, the sequence of debt distributions hψt(x)i converges to a unique invariant distribution as
claimed. ¥
52